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Decentralizing Occupational Health and Safety




The argument for government regulation of occupational safety
and health (OSH) is that unregulated firms have incentive to toler-
ate relatively high levels of disease and injury. To assert that firms
"tolerate relatively high levels of disease and injury" is to assert that
firms invest less in safety-related inputs (machine guards, training,
emission controls, and so forth) than firms would if they bore all the
costs of the occupational injuries and illnesses associated with their
production. Because firms do not bear these costs, they tend to
"waste" the physical well-being of workers.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)'
compensates for this alleged market failure by regulating levels of
safety directly, and enforcing these regulations through inspection
and fines for violations. The basic logic of the enforcement pro-
gram is that OSHA can make it unprofitable for firms to violate it's
regulations. Through fines that vary with the severity, frequency,
willfulness, or repeated nature of the violations, 2 OSHA can theo-
retically assure that the firms' expected penalties for violating regu-
lations (penalty for violation multiplied by the probability of
inspection and detection) exceeds the expected benefits of violating
the regulations (avoidance of regulatory compliance costs). OSHA
can conceivably strengthen its enforcement program, if necessary,
by increasing the frequency of inspections, and/or increasing the
penalties for any infractions.3
OSHA's enforcement program has been criticized repeatedly. It
is argued that with any conceivable budget OSHA can inspect only
a miniscule proportion of firms, and that fines have been far too low
to deter violations; 4 that uniform regulations are inappropriate be-
* Assistant Professor of Public Administration, Nelson A. Rockefeller College of
Public Affairs and Policy, State University of New York at Albany; B.A., University of
Massachusetts, 1973; Ph.D., Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
1979.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 651-78 (1976).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(e) (1975).
3. See Table I in text, at 109.
4. See, for example, Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regu-
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cause the benefits and costs of a uniform regulation differ signifi-
cantly across firms; 5 and that most accidents involve transitory
violations of safe practices, violations that can be detected only if
inspectors are present constantly.6 The best that can be said of
OSHA, the argument continues, is that the agency has reduced
some major occupational health hazards (e.g., asbestos, cotton dust,
and lead), and increased managers' and employees' attention to
safety and health problems. 7
Now is the time, the argument concludes, to move to a second
generation of regulation that recognizes the new managerial and
worker awareness of health and safety problems. Instead of
stressing enforcement of uniform, necessarily inefficient regulation,
OSHA could maintain and encourage management-labor coopera-
tion in dealing with safety and health problems. If employees are
given the information to monitor health and safety problems in
their firms, if advocates of strong health and safety programs gain a
foothold in management, and if frameworks for management-labor
cooperation are established, then preventing injuries and illnesses
will become a much higher priority for firms than in the pre-OSHA.
period. The market failure justifying regulation will thus be reme-
died directly, at least in a large number of firms. OSHA's enforce-
ment of uniform regulations, with its rigidities, sporadic
inspections, and other problems could be significantly deem-
phasized. OSHA could thus profitably channel its resources toward
information and training, and restrict its direct regulatory control
mainly to firms in which strong managerial and labor support of
safety programs does not develop. 8
lation, 10 BELL J. OF ECON. 117, 126 (1979). Professor Viscusi commented that, with
3.6 million workplaces in the nation in 1973, the probability of being inspected in any
year from 1971 to 1975 was only 0.02, and average penalties for firms were only $1.52.
This criticism oversimplifies the inspection program. Eliminating firms that have little
chance of being inspected (e.g., insurance offices, convenience stores, etc.), the number
of firms that OSHA might be interested in is much smaller. One study of 36,314 manu-
facturing firms found that, in 1977, fifteen percent of firms with eleven to forty-nine
employees were inspected, eighteen percent of firms with fifty to ninety-nine employees
were inspected, and twenty-nine percent of firms with 100 or more employees were
inspected. See CENTAUR ASSOCIATES, INC., MEASURING THE EFFECTWENESS OF
OSHA's WORKPLACE INSPECTIONS. Prepared for: Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, 32-45 (Dec. 1979).
5. See E. BARDACH & R.A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 58 (1982) [hereinafter cited as BARDACH & KA-
GAN]; and L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH 36, 48 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as BACOW].
6. See J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY 85 (1979).
7. See infra notes 43-56, 59-64 and accompanying text.
8. See BACOW, supra note 5, at 122; Voluntary Protection Programs to Supplement
enforcement and to provide safe and healthful working conditions 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025
(1982); Comprehensive Health Policy Announcement and Request for Public Comment
48 Fed. Reg. 54,546 (1983).
[Vol. 21
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A persistent theme running through the writings, conferences,
and statements on occupational safety and health policy is that the
bases of such decentralized cooperation are much stronger today
than in the early or mid-1970's. That is, managerial health and
safety staff are reportedly far stronger today than in pre-OSHA
times, and other managers now--even though grudgingly-recog-
nize the importance of occupational safety and health concerns. 9
Furthermore, workers' ability to negotiate for health-safety re-
sources has increased substantially in the last ten years.10
This Article examines (1) how managerial and worker response
to occupational safety and health problems has reportedly changed
over the last decade, and (2) the empirical significance of such
changes. The fundamental issue explored is whether efforts to de-
centralize health and safety regulation to firms themselves will be
able to draw on a greater employee involvement in health and safety
issues, and a greater managerial commitment to occupational safety
and health.
Section I discusses the theoretical argument for OSHA regula-
tion. This argument is based on safety programs' expected gains
and losses for the total firm. A model of organizational decision-
making within the firm can be inferred from this economic theory.
The theory implies that certain subunits will influence goal forma-
tion strongly and others only weakly; that there will not be strong
internal support for occupational health and safety programs; and
that firms' investment in health and safety will be relatively low.
Section II discusses how OSHA's regulatory program tries to rem-
edy directly the effects of this market failure, and how the aggres-
siveness and tone of the enforcement program has varied over time.
Section III examines the extent of changes in employee involvement
in health and safety issues as reflected, for example, in collective
bargaining agreements. Section IV explores greater managerial
commitment to health and safety as reflected, for example, in firms'
occupational health programs and in expenditures on health and
safety. The conclusion discusses the implications of these changes
for the-current efforts to decentralize health and safety regulation to
firms.
I. THE ARGUMENT FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
REGULATION
A. The Argument at the Level of the Firm
The argument for occupational safety and health regulation is
9. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
1984]
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that unregulated, profit-maximizing firms underinvest in injury and
illness prevention. It notes that profit-maximizing firms will invest
in safety inputs (machine guards, training, emission controls, etc.)
"to the point where [the inputs'] marginal cost is just offset by the
marginal savings they create by reducing injuries (thus avoiding at-
tendant workers' compensation premiums, compensating wage dif-
ferentials, production losses, machine damage, and so on).""
Occupational injuries and illnesses do, however, "cost" the firms
workers' compensation premiums, compensating wage differentials
(hazard pay), production losses, and machine damage. Production
losses and machine damage differ from workers' compensation pre-
miums and wage differentials, however, in an important respect.
Firms bear all the costs of lost production and machine damage,
and so will invest up to accidents' full production and machine costs
to prevent the accidents. Injuries and illnesses also cost workers
their income and physical well-being; the purpose of workers' com-
pensation programs and compensating wage differentials is to shift
these costs from workers to firms. However, workers' compensa-
tion and wage differentials probably cost firms less than the total
cost to workers of the injuries and illnesses, and thus workers them-
selves subsidize the firms' injury-illness costs.
There are good reasons to believe that workers' compensation
and compensating wage differentials do not cover the costs to work-
ers of occupational injuries and illnesses. First, workers' compensa-
tion systems usually replace only a portion of lost wages, and have
ceilings on benefits based on states' average weekly wages. 12 Sec-
ond, the workers' compensation system does not compensate occu-
pational disease victims adequately because of statutory restrictions
on claims, and because it is difficult for claimants to link their ill-
nesses with their occupations. 13 Third, pressing contested workers'
compensation claims is often time-consuming and costly, and work-
ers may not have the resources to negotiate the workers' compensa-
tion system successfully. 14 Fourth, the studies claiming that
workers in general receive additional wages compensating them for
11. Smith, The Impact of OSHA Inspections on Manufacturing Injury Rates, 14 J.
OF HUM. RESOURCES 145, 147-48 (1979).
12. III F. COLLINGNON, ESTIMATING AND FINANCING THE COSTS OF STATE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION, RESEARCH REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL-
WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE 35, 43 (1979).
13. Id. at 38. See also D.P. MCCAFFREY, OSHA AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH
REGULATION § 3.2.4, at 49 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MCCAFFREY] and references
therein.
14. See generally Occupational Diseases, 1977 Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1978); D.S.
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hazardous work are, at best, very ambiguous because data used in
the studies are too general and crude to support convincing statisti-
cal tests of the claims.15
Consequently, profit maximizing firms will invest less than the
full societal costs of occupational injuries and illnesses to prevent
injuries and illnesses. In effect, firms will tend to waste workers'
physical well-being, and thus governmental regulation of health and
safety is warranted.
B. Organizational Implications of the Argument
The argument of occupational safety and health regulation is dis-
cussed at the level of the firm. It focuses on "management" and
"workers," and does not articulate what decisionmaking processes
look like within firms that underinvest in health and safety. How-
ever, a model of organizational decisionmaking, described below, is
implied by the argument for occupational safety and health regula-
tions. (Section IV will discuss how organizational changes within
firms reportedly correct the market failures justifying OSH
regulation).
Organizations can be thought of as coalitions of participants.
Participants bargain and reach shifting agreements on what the or-
ganization will produce, what the products' special qualities will be,
the side effects of production that will be monitored and controlled,
and so forth.16 Participants in this bargaining have competing in-
terests, so the positions and pressures of departments like sales, pro-
duction, and pricing frequently conflict. 17
At any given time, the important problems facing the firm shape
who is and is not influential in this bargaining. Some problems are
critical. To take an exaggerated example, keeping production lines
running is more important than keeping the firm's social activities
in order. Beyond the very short run, participants who have the
technical competence to deal with critical problems, and who are
not easily replaced, are in a stronger bargaining position than
others. 18 If the problems are stable, these participants' power will
also be stable.
The demands of the production and sales departments are likely
to count heavily in a firm because either department's failure shows
15. Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review, 32 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 339 (1979).
16. R.N. CYERT & J.G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM § 3.1.1,
at 27 (1963).
17. Id. § 6.1, at 115.
18. J. PFEFFER & G.R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 230 (1978); Blackburn, Lower Participant Power: Toward a Conceptual Integra-
tion, 6 ACAD. OF MGMNT REV. 127, 130 (1981).
1984]
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up quickly in a firm's income. In contrast, when a firm is able to
pass on much of the cost of occupational injuries and illnesses to
workers, occupational safety and health maintenance will be less
compelling because there is only a small probability that a firm will
register sizable losses from deferring health and safety
investments. 19
Thus, unregulated, profit maximizing firms tend to underinvest
in employee safety and health because they do not bear a large share
of the costs of occupational injuries and illnesses. Managerial staff
who favor health and safety investment will not compete for re-
sources effectively with departments such as production and sales.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration tries to rem-
edy the effects of this situation by specifying that firms must main-
tain certain levels of health and safety. The next section discusses
the nature and trends of OSHA's regulatory program.
II. OSHA'S REGULATORY PROGRAM
Standard setting and inspections are the two key elements of
OSHA's regulatory program. By setting standards OSHA specifies,
for example, that workers' exposure to toxic substances cannot ex-
ceed certain levels, that machines must have certain safety devices,
that workers must receive health-safety training, and so on.20
OSHA's inspections attempt to enforce these standards (or regula-
tions), levying fines for violations. 21 Over its twelve year history,
OSHA's standards setting activity has been concentrated in two pe-
riods-1971 and 1977 to 1978.
A. Standards Setting
Prior to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Department
of Labor required that firms performing government supported
work adhere to numerous safety and health standards, such as re-
quirements that firms maintain safety devices on certain ma-
chines.22 Also, private standards setting associations such as the
National Fire Protection Association and the American National
Standards Institute had developed voluntary safety and health stan-
dards applying to most types of work.23 In 1971, as mandated by
19. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1975).
21. Id. § 659.
22. N.A. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND
INJURY, A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION § 2.4.2, at 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as ASHFORD].
23. See Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of
Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1329 (1978).
[Vol. 21
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the Occupational Safety and Health Act,24 OSHA made these vol-
untary standards compulsory for all firms subject to the Act.25
Most of these standards were safety standards, but the initial stan-
dards also included exposure limits (Threshold Limit Values, or
TLV's) for about 420 toxic substances. These TLV's did not re-
quire work-practice controls, exposure monitoring, recordkeeping,
or other characteristics of standards developed after 1971; the TLV
exposure limits have also been criticized as being relatively high.26
Since 1971, OSHA's additional standards have principally been
for toxic substances. The most intensive development of standards
since 1971 occurred in 1977-1978, which were the first two years of
the administration of Eula Bingham under President Carter.27
24. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1975).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983).
26. ASHFORD, supra note 22, § 6.4.1, at 296.
27. To 1984, there had been twelve major final standards: asbestos 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1001 (1983); thirteen little-used carcinogens 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1003-1910.1016
(1983) [originally, OSHA issued standards for fourteen carcinogens, including the thir-
teen plus a more widely used substance trade named MOCA. The standard for MOCA
was vacated on procedural grounds in Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfr's Ass'n v. Bren-
nan, 506 F.2d 385 (3d. Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Worker's Int'l Union AFi-C1O V. Dunlop, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); see also MCCAFFREY,
supra note 13, § 5.1.2, at 82, and the references therein]; vinyle chloride 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1017 (1983); coke oven emissions 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044 (1983); DBCP 29
C.F.R. § 1910.10 (1983); arsenic 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018 (1983); cotton dust 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1043 (1983); acrylonitrile 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045 (1983); lead 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1025 (1983); hearing conservation programs 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983); noise ex-
posure 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983); revised exposure limits for asbestos 29 C.F.R. § 1910
(1983); and labeling of toxic substances in the workplace 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200.
The most intensive standards development since 1971 occurred in 1977-1978. OSHA
had considered the arsenic, cotton dust, and lead standards for several years, but did not
issue the final standards until Bingham's administration; see MCCAFFREY, supra note
13, § 6.1, at 105. OSHA issued the DBCP and acrylonitrile standards, initially as emer-
gency temporary standards, after the General Accounting Office, among others, had
criticized OSHA's slow development of standards (U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, DELAYS IN SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER CAUSING AND
OTHER DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES (1977)), and Bingham noted the criticism before the
two-year wave of activity (Performance on the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration: Hearings before a Subcomm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977)). Also, five days after Bingham assured the House of Representatives that
OSHA would respond immediately to evidence of workers being in "grave danger"
from toxic substances, OSHA issued an emergency standard for benzene (42 Fed. Reg.
22,516 (1977)) and issued a permanent standard for benzene nine months later (43 Fed.
Reg. 5,918 (1978)) (later codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1983)).
The Bingham administration issued no major additional final standards after 1978.
The Bingham administration issued the standard for occupational exposure to benzene(43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978)). However, the Supreme Court struck down the standard,
with the most important issue being the relative weakness of the evidence of risk associ-
ated with lower concentrations of benzene. Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). In 1980, OSHA issued a major policy framework
for the identification, classification, and regulation of potential carcinogens. However,
the framework was not a regulation of substances themselves, and was in fact disre-
garded by the Reagan administration; see 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1983); and MCCAFFREY,
supra note 13, § 6.1.7, at 125. Also, the hearing conservation and labeling standards
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B. Inspections
OSHA enforces its standards through inspections and fines for
violations. 28 The agency has at times relied on confrontational en-
forcement, far more, as opposed to consultation with employers.
The aggressiveness of OSHA's enforcement program grew through
the 1970's, peaked with the Bingham administration from 1977 to
1980, and shifted to a decidedly less confrontational approach
under Thorne Auchter from 1981 to 1983.
Several variables, taken together, indicate these shifts. Table I
lists four of these variables: the number of inspections, the average
proposed penalties per inspection, the ratio of penalties actually
paid in a fiscal year to penalties proposed in a fiscal year, and the
percentage of inspections contested by employers. Although each
variable is ambiguous in certain respects, changes in the variables
are sufficiently strong to suggest changes in enforcement policies.
For example, the decline in average proposed penalties per inspec-
tion from 1981 to 1983 could suggest that more firms had complied
with OSHA regulations; however, the shift in 1981 is much too ab-
rupt to be explained by sudden compliance. Similarly, the penalties
remitted in a fiscal year are not necessarily for inspections con-
ducted in that year because of lags between citation and payment,
and so Column 3 is not a direct accounting record of the percentage
of proposed penalties actually collected in a certain year. However,
the relationship between the two figures in a given year indicates
reasonably well OSHA's willingness to impose penalties over em-
ployers' strong objections, employers' relative willingness to contest
the penalties, and the degree of eventual penalty mitigation.
Table I suggests that the number of inspections dropped substan-
tially after 1976. However, this decline reflected a decline in
"quick" low-payoff inspections, inspections of larger firms, a shift
to more time-consuming health hazard inspections, and an in-
creased coverage in individual inspections.29 The average proposed
penalties per inspection peaked during the Bingham administration,
and dropped substantially during the Auchter administration. The
issued under Thorne Auchter's administration, beginning in 1981, eased the require-
ments of standards proposed but not issued in final form earlier. Supporters of the
administration maintained that the modifications improved the efficiency of the stan-
dards, while critics argued that the standards had been excessively weakened. See
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 891 (Mar. 17, 1983), O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 691 (Dec. 1, 1983).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1975).
29. See the OSHA responses in the reports by the U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, WORKPLACE INSPECTION PROGRAM WEAK IN DETECTING AND COR-
RECTING SERIOUs HAZARDS (1978); SPORADIC WORKPLACE INSPECTIONS FOR LE-
THAL AND OTHER SERIOUS HEALTH HAZARDS (1978); and How EFFECTIVE ARE
OSHA's COMPLAINT PROCEDURES? (1979).
[Vol. 21
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ratio of remitted to proposed penalties suggests that, as the average
proposed penalties declined dramatically, employers were less likely
to contest inspections; this speculation is supported by the decline in
the percentage of inspections contested.30
Beginning in 1981, under Thorne Auchter, OSHA minimized
confrontation with employers, and stressed the development of
firms' own safety programs. The administration maintained that
OSHA had overemphasized confrontational enforcement in the
past, that OSHA ought to provide far more technical assistance,
and that aggressive inspections turned firms against OSHA. 31
OSHA's proposed penalties dropped precipitously; OSHA's re-
gional and area office supervisors, for example, commonly reduced
inspectors' initial penalty and citation levels.32
30. The remitted/proposed penalty ratio understates significantly one type of miti-
gation that developed in 1981. That is, the field or area office supervisors of inspectors
reportedly began reducing the penalties originally suggested by inspectors. The "pro-
posed penalty" information forwarded to the national office would not reflect this type
of mitigation. See P.J. SIMON, REAGAN IN THE WORKPLACE: UNRAVELING THE
HEALTH AND SAFETY NET 77-78 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SIMON].
31. O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 123 (July 8, 1982); O.S.H. (BNA) 206 (July 29, 1982);
O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 436-37 (Oct. 13, 1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg.
54,546 (1983).
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The centerpiece of the new regulatory policy was the encourage-
ment of internal safety programs developed by management, or
management and labor. OSHA offered to exempt a firm from rou-
tine inspections and to quickly process a firm's requests for a vari-
ance from a standard if the firm established a voluntary
occupational safety and health program which was subject to review
by OSHA.33 The policy's logic was that firms would value relief
from routine inspections and rapid variance processing so highly
that they would institute safety or health programs that they other-
wise would not establish. Participation in the first year of the pro-
gram was relatively low, 34 but one year is insufficient time to
evaluate the effort. Participation could increase as employers
learned of the voluntary programs and of their requirements. Con-
versely, participation might not increase (and could even decline) if
OSHA had devalued the inspection exemption by easing enforce-
ment after 1981. 35
In general, OSHA's enforcement program was most aggressive in
the 1977-1980 period, and, to a lesser extent, in the early 1970's.
OSHA established many standards in the early 1970's, but its in-
spection program did not mature until the mid-1970's. In 1977-
1980 OSHA coupled a fairly active standards development program
(1977-1978) with its most aggressive inspections. After 1980,
OSHA substantially diminished standards setting and confronta-
tional inspections in favor of consultation with, and technical assist-
ance for, employers.
III. OSHA-INDUCED CHANGES IN FIRMS: AN EVALUATION
Section I discussed the justifications for OSHA regulation-that
is, that unregulated firms underinvest in injury-illness prevention
because they can pass a large share of the costs of injuries and ill-
nesses on to workers. Under this type of market failure, internal
supporters of strong job safety and health programs will lack influ-
ence because they cannot argue persuasively that the firm would
suffer financially if it underinvests in safety and health. Section II
reviewed how OSHA tries to remedy the effects of market failure by
specifying and enforcing safety and health standards in firms. The
next sections examine the extent to which these pressures have af-
fected firms in two areas; first, the involvement of workers in
health-safety bargaining, and second, managerial decisionmaking
on health and safety.
33. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (1982); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
34. SIMON, supra note 30, at 37.
35. O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 339-40 (Sept. 23, 1982); SIMON, supra note 30, at 38.
[Vol. 21
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A. Employee Involvement in Health-Safety Bargaining
and Decisions
Traditionally, management makes the key decisions on health
and safety investments. 36 Although employees bear many of the
costs of occupational injury and illness, their pressure for greater
health and safety investments has been sporadic. Several factors
limit workers negotiations over job safety and health. Although
safety hazards are visible, workers have frequently not had informa-
tion on many occupational health hazards. They have not been en-
titled to receive information on most hazards from employers, and
obtaining information from outside sources was often expensive and
difficult. 37 Even if hazards are recognized, workers will be reluc-
tant to argue for major production or process changes if they risk
being fired, or fear that the changes could bankrupt the firm. 38
Also, union leaders may be unwilling to spend a great deal of
limited bargaining resources on health and safety issues when (1)
the benefits of better conditions flow to a small number of young
workers in particularly hazardous jobs, or (2) the benefits of the
bargaining are intangible (e.g., a reduction in cancer rates among a
firm's workers not recognizable for 15-20 years). 39 Also, unions
who assume a greater role in health-safety programs run the risk of
being sued by injured or ill workers for failing to remove particular
hazards.40 Successful suits of this type, though few, 41 have inhib-
ited some union locals from bargaining vigorously for greater roles
in health-safety decisionmaking. 42
B. The Basis of Increased Employee Involvement
in OSH Bargaining
Recognizing these limits on bargaining, there is nevertheless a
strong theme running through the writings, meetings, and state-
ments on OSHA policy that employees increased their involvement
in health-safety matters substantially after the early 1970's. 43 The
36. O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1411 (Apr. 9, 1981); BACOW, supra note 5, at 93.
37. MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, § 3.2.4.2, at 51; Need for Hazardous Identification
Standard 46 Fed. Reg. 4413 (1981).
38. MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, § 3.2.2.1, at 43; BACOW, supra note 5, at 89.
39. BACOW, supra note 5, at 94.
40. O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 725 (Feb. 4, 1982); Drapkin & Davis, Health and Safety
Provisions in Union Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 635 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Drapkin & Davis].
41. See, e.g., Helton v. Hake, 564 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 959 (1978); Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of Am., 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21
(1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Drapkin & Davis, supra note 40, at 647-52.
42. BACOW, supra note 5, at 97; see supra note 40, and references therein.
43. See, e.g., O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 978-79 (Apr. 21, 1983); O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 427
(Oct. 28, 1982); O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1411 (Apr. 9, 1981); O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 977 (Jan.
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Occupational Safety and Health Act arguably increased workers'
willingness and resources to deal with safety-health issues in two
respects. First, the Act increased greatly the amount of public in-
formation on safety and health hazards, and ways to control them.
Workers acquired this information through unions, the media, and
other channels. Second, the Act gave workers the right to call in
OSHA, and/or the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) from within the Department of Health and
Human Services, to examine specific conditions in their work-
place.44 This shifted the bargaining situation from one in which
managers confronted workers alone to one in which managers con-
fronted workers who had the right to call in outside inspectors and
get virtually free technical help.
1. Information on Health-Safety Problems.-The Occupational
Safety and Health Act increased the amount of publicly available
information on safety and health hazards and control technology.
OSHA and NIOSH fund a great deal of research on occupational
safety and health issues.45, Also, OSHA and NIOSH have turned
into centers of debate on safety and health policy, and these debates
have to be conducted in the open.46 Thus, there has been a great
increase in the amount of information available on health and safety
hazards, and on ways to control these hazards.
Workers acquire information through a loose process that usually
involves some combination of the media, researchers hired by man-
agement, management, government agencies, unions, and labels on
toxic substances. 47 The Occupational Safety and Health Act also
mandates that OSHA and NIOSH distribute information. 48
OSHA's post-1971 toxic substance regulations typically require that
workers be given information on hazards,49 and OSHA has issued a
regulation requiring identification of hazardous chemical
substances.50
As noted earlier, the lack of information about hazards, or the
cost of the information, has impeded workers' involvement in
health-safety decisions. The relative increase in the availability of
16, 1975); A. FREEDMAN, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO HEALTH RISK 46 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FREEDMAN]; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LA-
BOR STATISTICS, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: SAFETY AND
HEALTH PROVISIONS (1976).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(0, 660(c), 669(a)(6) (1976).
45. Id. §§ 657(c) (g), 669, 673.
46. Id. §§ 655-57.
47. MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, at 31-33, 40-61, and references therein.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(g), 673 (1976).
49. For a listing of the provisions, see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1983).
50. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280 (1983) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1900.1200).
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low-cost information presumably ought to have increased workers'
health-safety activities.
2. Direct Government Assistance. Complaint Inspections and
Health Hazard Evaluations.-The Occupational Safety and Health
Act gives individuals the right to request inspections of specific
hazards, and requires OSHA to inspect the firm unless OSHA sees
no reasonable grounds to believe that violation of a standard or
other danger exists. The complainant remains anonymous, and if
the complainant's identity is discovered the employer cannot legally
retaliate.5 1 In the mid-1970's both the AFL-CIO and OSHA publi-
cized the right of employees to request inspections, leading to a sub-
stantial increase in the number of complaints and complaint
inspections (See Table II).52
The complaint right increases workers' influence in health-safety
issues in two respects. First, a complaint inspection brings OSHA
directly into a labor-management dispute over an alleged hazard,
increasing the pressure on the employer to resolve the dispute. The
significance of the additional pressure has varied as OSHA in-
creased and then lowered its support of complaint inspections (See
Table II). However, the impact of a complaint inspection is proba-
bly never trivial.
Second, employees have been able to use the threat of a complaint
to OSHA as a bargaining chip in health-safety disputes. Once
workers tell managers that they will "call in OSHA" if a condition
is not remedied, the chance that managers will take the workers'
requests seriously is increased. Unions, in particular, have used this
tactic effectively.53
In addition to giving individuals the right to request OSHA in-
spections, the Occupational Safety and Health Act gave individuals
the right to request Health Hazard Evaluations (HHE's). Upon re-
quest from an employee or employer, the Act requires the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to determine if a sub-
stance normally present in a workplace has toxic effects in the con-
centrations in which it is found.54 An Urban Systems study of 180
HHE's conducted between 1976 and 1978 found that about two-
thirds of the requests for Health Hazard Evaluations came from
workers, and that about ninety percent (90%) of the employee re-
quests came from union representatives. 5 Following criticism that
51. 29 U.S.C. § 657(0 (1976).
52. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, § 7.3, at 149 and references therein.
53. BACOW, supra note 5, at 97, 108.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6) (1976).
55. URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, INC., AN EVALUATION OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF NIOSH's HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION PROGRAM. PREPARED
FOR: NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 19 (1979).
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TABLE II
COMPLAINT INSPECTION AND HEALTH HAZARD
EVALUATION (HHE) ACTIVITY, FY 1973-1983
Complaint Inspections Health Hazard Evaluations
Number Percent Requests Evaluations
Conducted of Inspections Received Conducted
Fiscal
Year
1973 6,623 13.7% 152 80
1974 6,409 8.3 190 60
1975 7,139 8.8 170 90
1976 9,160 10.1 200 160
1977 19,270 32.2 190 160
1978 21.485 37.6 210 140
1979 20,158 34.8 230 140
1980 16,093 25.4 429 192
1981 13,448 23.5 513 234
1982 6,761 11.0 423 496'
19832 2,864 8.9% N.A. N.A.
SOURCE: Compiled from data provided by OSHA Office of Management Data Sys-
tems and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
1. Includes evaluations requested in earlier years.
2. Data are for first half of fiscal year.
OSHA had inadequately publicized the Health Hazard Evaluation
program, and after appointment of Anthony Robbins in 1979 as
Institute Director, NIOSH expanded the program.5 6
Historically, workers have not generally bargained strongly on
occupational and safety health issues and the limits on bargaining
persist. OSHA has, however, arguably loosened these limits signifi-
cantly. The increase in low-cost information on hazards and con-
trol technology, as well as the rights to request OSHA inspections
and NIOSH health hazard evaluations, could increase workers'
willingness and ability to engage employers directly on health and
safety issues. The new information and inspection rights could in-
crease willingness because they identify previously unknown or ill-
defined hazards. They increase ability because they lower the costs
of pressure on employers. Workers find that useful information is
more freely available, and that OSHA and NIOSH can be called on
to exert pressure that previously had to be exerted solely by the
workers.
56. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH HAZARD EVALU-
ATION PROGRAM NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (1978); MCCAFFREY, supra note 13, § 7.2, at
146.
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C. The Significance of Increased Employee Involvement
The argument that workers' bargaining over safety and health is
significantly stronger today than in the early 1970's is plausible, and
noted repeatedly. Yet, data on OSHA's inspection policies and on
collective bargaining agreements offer only mixed support for the
assertion.
New employee strength based on the right to request OSHA in-
spections or Health Hazard Evaluations is fragile. As Table II indi-
cates, OSHA's support of complaint inspections grew after 1976,
but then dropped precipitously after 1981. NIOSH's Health Haz-
ard Evaluation program grew after 1979, but the program is still
relatively small. (Compare, for example, the number of Health
Hazard Evaluations conducted to the number of complaint inspec-
tions, even in 1982).
Most striking is the relative lack of change in collective bargain-
ing agreements between 1975 and 1980. The Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics conducts a survey of provisions in collective bargaining
agreements at five year intervals. Data from the different surveys
are not precisely comparable, as agreements may appear in one sur-
vey but not in another.5 7 However, year to year comparisons indi-
cate the approximate changes in the frequency of provisions. Three
provisions that ought to have appeared more frequently in recent
years, if workers were more involved in health-safety bargaining,
are (1) a right to refuse hazardous work, (2) a right for union com-
mittees to inspect and investigate hazards, either alone or jointly
with management; and (3) pledges of cooperative union-manage-
ment safety programs. Table III compares the 1975 and 1980
figures on these provisions in eleven manufacturing industries.5 8
The figures represent the percentage of collective bargaining agree-
ments in the industries with the provisions, and the percentages of
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements in the industry
that has the provisions.
Table III suggests that (1) a minority of agreements have the pro-
visions, particularly the right to refuse hazardous work and the
right of inspection; (2) a minority of workers are covered by the
provisions; and (3) there was relatively little change in either the
57. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JULY 1, 1975
27 (1977); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 1,
1980, 35 (1981).
58. Using data from a McGraw-Hill survey, a later section examines industries'
investment in safety and health related capital. To maintain comparability, Tables III,
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frequency or coverage of provisions between 1975 and 1980. In
only one industry-stone, clay, and glass products-was there a
substantial, consistent increase in the number of agreements which
contained the provisions, and in the number of workers covered by
the provisions. (This industry includes asbestos manufacturing, an
industry with the most highly publicized health hazard of the last
twenty years. There probably was a spillover of concern from the
asbestos industry to related firms in the stone, clay, and glass cate-
gory). Even in the stone, clay, and glass industry, only one-quarter
to one-third of the agreements contained the provisions, and
twenty-five to forty-two percent of the workers in the industry were
covered by them.
There are exceptions to this pattern. Some of the provisions were
common in some industries already in 1975 (e.g., in the rubber and
plastics, and primary metals industries) and there were some in-
creases (and declines) in the frequency of provisions scattered
across industries between 1975 and 1980. Yet, in general, the cov-
erage is far more limited and far more stable than one would expect
if there had been a surge of employee bargaining and involvement in
occupational health and safety issues in the 1970's.
Overall, the available data does not support the impression that
employee bargaining over job safety and health has increased sub-
stantially in the last decade. The availability of information, and
the rights to inspections and Health Hazard Evaluations under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, probably increased worker
awareness of health and safety hazards and workers' leverage with
management only marginally. Even during OSHA's most active
regulatory period (1977-1980) the frequency of safety and health
provisions in collective bargaining agreements was relatively stable.
There have been some changes, but their significance should not be
overstated.
It would be premature to conclude that, overall, firms still tend to
underinvest in employee safety and health. There have reportedly
been extensive changes in managerial decisionmaking that lead
firms to pay far greater attention to occupational safety and health
than in earlier years.
IV. MANAGERIAL ATTENTION TO HEALTH-SAFETY ISSUES
A. The Growth of Firms' Health-Safety Programs
Another theme running through the writings, conferences, and
statements on OSHA is that the managerial staff specializing in oc-
cupational health and safety has increased greatly since the early
1970's. These staffs, above the plant level in multi-plant corpora-
tions, monitor hazards in plants, keep track of health and safety
[Vol. 21
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performance, and keep up with regulatory requirements.5 9 They
have established new information systems to record data on
hazards, occupational safety and health performance, and regula-
tion in the firms. Several large chemical firms have established
their own occupational safety and health data systems, and many
smaller firms are reportedly participating in cooperative record
keeping systems.60
The corporate health-safety staff can point out-in fact, it is their
purpose to point out-how certain operations, or changes in
processes or equipment, might violate OSHA regulations or pro-
duce health-safety problems. A 1981 Conference Board survey on
corporate decisionmaking changes quoted one executive who spoke
of a "counterbureaucracy-a cadre of specialists whose knowledge,
training, and narrow responsibilities are characteristic of the regula-
tors themselves." The report suggested that "operations people"
had initially resisted the specialists' involvement, but now com-
monly recognize the need to consider the regulatory impact of pro-
duction decisions.6'
The Conference Board survey also asked 354 firms how the pres-
ence of occupational safety and health regulations had affected deci-
sionmaking authority within the company in different respects.
Twenty-three percent reported that related decisions had moved to
a higher level in the company; forty-nine percent said that the
number of departments involved in decisions had increased; and
fifty percent said that the company had more administrative con-
straints on related decisions.62
Numerous analysts, who are troubled by corporate failures in
health-safety work, point out that government regulators are not
able to design standards that recognize important differences be-
tween firms, and are unable to monitor firms' behavior sufficiently
closely to prevent health-safety problems. These analysts argue that
structural changes such as the new health-safety staffs ought to be
encouraged. The changes establish agents within the corporation
who have occupational interests in arguing forcefully for attention
to health and safety, and the resources-such as information and
access to higher levels in the firm-to present their cases. 63 In ef-
59. FREEDMAN, supra note 43; E.D. McGUIRE, THE PRODUCT SAFETY FUNC-
TION: ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS (1979); R. BERENBEIM, REGULATION: ITS
IMPACT ON DECISION MAKING (1981) [hereinafter cited as BERENBEIM]; BARDACH &
KAGAN, supra note 5, at 95; Chemical Week, Jan. 13, 1982, at 40-41; Mar. 3, 1982, at
37; June 16, 1982, at 40; O.S.H. (BNA) 427-28 (Oct. 28, 1982).
60. Business Week, Mar. 21, 1983 at 142D; FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 22.
61. BERENBEIM, supra note 59, at 18-19; see also, Chemical Week, Feb. 10, 1982, at
28.
62. BERENBEIM, supra note 59, at 12.
63. See supra note 59.
1984]
19
McCaffrey: Decentralizing Occupational Health and Safety Regulation: An Eval
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
fect, the changes arguably are a direct organizational correction of
the "market failure" justifying regulation in the first place-namely
a lack of organizational attention to health and safety.
Some firms, particularly those involved in well-publicized
"epidemics" of occupational illnesses, or other environmental "di-
sasters," clearly increased their attention to health and safety in the
1970's.6A4 However, two important issues remain: (1) the propor-
tion of firms that have changed in this way, and (2) whether the
influence of health-safety staff depends heavily on the possibility of
active government regulation and consequent de-emphasis of direct
regulation would undermine their influence, or alternatively,
whether their influence now operates relatively independently of di-
rect government regulation.
B. The Significance and Stability of Managerial Changes
The evidence that firms in general substantially increased their
attention to health and safety in the last decade is, in fact, quite
limited. Most of the evidence consists of descriptions of individual
programs, that might in fact have existed well before OSHA; de-
scriptions of new programs, that might in fact be few in number; or
assertions that most firms have to consider health and safety issues
far more now than in the past, which might in fact be untrue.
The best evidence documenting greater overall corporate atten-
tion to health and safety is the Conference Board survey on deci-
sionmaking changes in response to regulation. 65 But, despite its
considerable value, the Conference Board report is methodologi-
cally and substantively ambiguous in important respects. Method-
ologically, the Conference Board report gives no reason to believe
that the surveyed firms comprise a sample from which one could
draw general conclusions. The study mentions that 401 companies
returned the questionnaire, but does not discuss how the orginal
sampling frame was selected, nor even the sampling frame's size.
At the outset, then, the report's results are interesting but not sub-
ject to generalization. Substantively, the Conference Board re-
sults, 66 refer to centralization of authority, additional
administrative constraints, and an increase in the number of depart-
ments involved in decisions. But the study did not examine how
these shifts affected the level of resources devoted to health and
safety by firms, nor how stable the shifts were. (These issues were
beyond the scope of the survey).
To assess the proportion of firms with developed occupational
64. Chemical Week, Mar. 3, 1982, at 37.
65. BERENBEIM, supra note 59.
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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health and safety efforts, and the stability of the resources devoted
to health and safety, two types of data are examined below: infor-
mation on firms' occupational medical programs for 1975 and 1977,
and on industries' capital expenditures for employee safety and
health 1972-1982. Neither type of information, nor even the two
together, address the issues definitively. However, the two types of
information are the best available, and using other data would not
change the results significantly. 67
1. Occupational Health Programs.-As noted above, the
number of firms with occupational health programs reportedly in-
creased in the last decade. First, we examine the frequency with
which firms in eleven manufacturing industries provided elemen-
tary occupational health activities in 1975 and 1977; subsequently,
the trend of capital expenditures on health and safety is explored.
In its surveys of occupational injuries and illnesses for 1975 to
1977, the Bureau of Labor Statistics asked firms whether they pro-
vided different types of occupational medical services. 68 Table IV
was prepared using a file of 19,290 firms; each of the firms partici-
pated in the BLS survey in each year from 1975 to 1977. Table IV
gives the percentage of firms providing three types of occupational
health services for 1975 and 1977: periodic general medical exami-
nations, periodic medical surveillance examinations, and post-injury
or illness examinations. 69 These basic services are the foundations
of exposure monitoring systems, record keeping systems, and other
elements of comprehensive occupational health programs and
therefore, would likely be established before comprehensive pro-
grams.70 Thus, figures in Table IV represent an upper boundary on
firms providing occupational health programs in the year, and the
percentage of firms with comprehensive programs was probably ap-
preciably lower.
67. See D.P. MCCAFFREY, AN ASSESSMENT OF OSHA's RECENT EFFECTS ON
INJURY RATES AND HAZARD PREVENTION WORK: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SCI-
ENCE FOUNDATION 46 (1982).
68. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY,
1975 at 8 (1978); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUS-
TRY, 1977 at 7 (1980).
69. Medical surveillance examination monitor employees for specific symptoms as-
sociated with substances or tasks on their jobs. Post-injury or illness examinations refer
to examinations given to workers after their return from a lost-time occupational injury
or illness.
70. AOMA Medical Information Systems Committee, Utilization of Medical Infor-
mation Systems in American Occupational Medicine, 19 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL MED.
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TABLE IV
PERCENTAGES OF FIRMS PROVIDING MEDICAL
EXAMINATIONS, 1975-1977
Periodic General Periodic Surveillance
1975 1977 1975 1977
15.3% 16.5% 6.6% 7.7%
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SOURCE: Compiled from data provided by U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
The percentages of firms in most industries providing periodic
general medical examinations and medical surveillance examina-
tions, were about ten to twenty percent. The figures for chemical,
petroleum and coal products industries, were about thirty-forty per-
cent for both types of examinations. The figures for periodic medi-
cal surveillance examinations in primary metals and transportation
equipment were twenty-three to thirty percent. One-quarter to one-
third of firms examined workers after a lost-time injury or illness;
chemicals, petroleum and coal, primary metals, and transportation
equipment industries providing the examinations somewhat more
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firms provided the examinations in 1977 than in 1975, but the in-
creases were quite small.
Thus, in 1977, a minority of firms had these basic occupational
health activities. A few industries conducted the examinations
more frequently than others, but even in these industries a minority
of firms did so. It should be kept in mind that these examinations
are very elementary services, and do not represent what would be
considered developed occupational health and safety programs.71
The number of firms providing the occupational health services
since 1977 may have increased significantly. Unfortunately, the
BLS stopped collecting these data in 1977, and there is no compara-
ble survey of occupational health services extending to the present
time.
2. Health-Safety Capital Expenditures.-One survey that does go
to the present is the McGraw-Hill survey of capital expenditures
related to employee safety and health. 72 The Arthur Andersen
study of forty-eight firms' OSHA-related costs reported that thirty-
seven percent of the costs were capital costs. Fifty-six percent of
the costs were operating and administrative costs,73 a large share of
which would presumably be associated with the firms' capital
equipment. Thus, trends in capital costs probably indicate reason-
ably well the direction of occupational safety and health related ex-
penses in general. If firms increased their capital spending in the
post-1977 period, overall resources committed to safety and health
likely increased as well, and the number of firms with strong health-
safety programs would have likely increased. If expenditures re-
mained stable or declined since 1977, there would be reason to ques-
tion the claim that the number of firms with strong safety and
health programs increased appreciably since that time.
Table V above gives the capital expenditures on employee safety
and health, in constant dollars, and the expenditures as a percent of
total capital expenditures, for eleven manufacturing industries, 1972
to 1982.
In general, as measured by the proportion of capital expenditures
devoted to safety and health, 1972 to 1976 was the period of heavi-
71. AOMA Medical Information Systems Committee, Utilization of Medical Infor-
mation Systems in American Occupational Medicine, 19 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL MED.
819 (1977); O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 436 (Oct. 13, 1983); 48 Fed. Reg. 54,546 (1983), supra
note 8.
72. MCGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, 11TH ANNUAL
MCGRAW-HILL SURVEY OF INVESTMENT IN EMPLOYEE SAFETY AND HEALTH (1983)
[hereinafter cited as SURVEY].
73. ARTHUR ANDERSEN AND COMPANY, COST OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION:
STUDY FOR THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE REPORT 8-5 (1979).
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TABLE V
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES FOR EMPLOYEE SAFETY AND
HEALTH, YEARLY AVERAGES OF CONSTANT
1972 DOLLARS (MILLIONS) AND OF
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT, 1972-1982
Industry 1972-1976 1977-1980 1981-1982
Food $98 $94 $95
2.9% 2.6% 2.4%
Paper 50 43 71
2.5% 1.5% 2.4%
Chemicals 131 195 263
2.6% 3.4% 4.1%
Petroleum 131 148 136
2.2% 1.7% 1.1%
Rubber 46 36 29
4.0% 3.7% 3.4%
Stone, clay, glass 58 54 22
4.3% 3.0% 1.5%
Primary metals 130 51 89
4.7% 1.7% 2.9%
Fabricated metals 27 50 34
1.7% 3.0% 2.5%
Machinery 110 138 43
2.9% 2.7% .7%
Electrical equipment $68 $79 $76
2.4% 2.1% 1.5%
SOURCE: Compiled from data reported in 11th Annual McGraw-Hill Survey of In-
vestment in Employee Safety and Health.
est occupational safety and health related investment. In most in-
dustries there were relative declines in expenditures since that
period, although the absolute amount of expenditures may not have
declined appreciably. There are a few exceptions, with the most
notable being the large absolute and relative increases in such ex-
penditures in the chemical industry.
The McGraw-Hill report for 1983 indicated that the relative de-
cline in expenditures could be attributed to the slowing of OSHA's
regulatory activities. The current expenditures, noted the report,
are:
substantially lower than the share of spending allocated to em-
ployee safety and health during the 1970's. . . . Relatively few
new safety and health standards have been proposed in recent
years and most companies have already complied with existing
regulations. As a result, the trend toward a lower share of capi-
[Vol. 21
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tal spending going to safety and health is expected to continue.74
The pattern of capital spending suggests that OSHA's regulatory
program does tend to produce increases or decreases in firms' occu-
pational safety and health activities. The pattern of capital spend-
ing also leads one to question the claim that far more firms have
strong health and safety programs at present than in the mid-
1970's. It is difficult to believe that firms would be rapidly ex-
panding expenditures on internal safety and health programs as
they were diminishing capital expenditures on safety and health.
Perhaps some firms, particularly those that experience dramatic
health-safety failures, established or expanded programs. Also,
firms in the chemical industry are particularly likely to invest in
health and safety programs. But it would be wrong to conclude
from these cases that there has been a general, significant increase
in attention to health and safety issues.
CONCLUSION
Reportedly, it is time for regulatory policy to recognize and draw
on the increased managerial and worker activity on health and
safety matters which has developed over the last decade. OSHA's
role in this decentralized regulation should be to provide technical
assistance to firms setting up and maintaining safety programs, and
to regulate firms directly when they do not develop sound health
and safety programs. 75
In principal, the case for reorienting occupational health and
safety regulation in this way is strong. Assuring that firms have
strong internal incentives to maintain health and safety is preferable
to uniform regulation of health and safety activities. Uniform regu-
lation may be necessary if firms do underinvest in health and safety,
but it is only a second best solution to the problem. 76 However, this
Article has suggested that the practical foundation of a decentral-
ized regulatory system is weaker than is commonly recognized, and
that the current easing of direct regulatory pressures in fact contra-
dicts the efforts to strengthen the foundation.
Collective bargaining agreements suggest that employees' in-
volvement in health-safety bargaining and decisionmaking is rela-
tively limited, and has not increased substantially since the mid-
1970's. Yet the frequency of health-safety provisions in collective
bargaining agreements likely represents the upper limits of worker
involvement, since non-unionized workers are less able to influence
74. SURVEY, supra note 72, at 2.
75. See supra note 8.
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health-safety decisions in firms. Furthermore, in the early 1980's,
OSHA diminished employees' resources in health-safety bargaining
by curtailing complaint inspections and reducing standards-setting
activities. It is reasonable to expect that workers' ability to influ-
ence health and safety decisions will actually decline in the 1980's.77
Similarly, the evidence that managers attend more extensively to
health-safety issues now than in the early 1970's is mixed at best.
Most of the evidence is anecdotal, and not generalizable or well-
documented. The most impressive study on the subject-the Con-
ference Board survey on regulation-induced decisionmaking
changes-is methodologically and substantively ambiguous. Other
evidence directly conflicts with the view; the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics survey on occupational health activities in 1975 and 1977
suggested that a minority of firms conducted elementary occupa-
tional health activities. 78
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the early
1980's announced that it would encourage firms to significantly im-
prove their occupational health and safety programs. It offered ex-
emptions from routine inspections to induce firms to participate. 79
Yet, simultaneously, OSHA diminished standards setting activities
significantly and eased the pressures of inspections on firms gener-
ally.80 It is too early to evaluate definitively how firms will respond
to OSHA's regulatory policies since 1981. However, there is no a
priori reason to believe that a large number of firms will upgrade
their health and safety programs in a period of regulatory retrench-
ment. The McGraw-Hill survey reported that the relative shares of
health-safety capital expenditures declined in the 1980's-the chem-
ical industry being a notable exception-and that the relative reduc-
tion could be attributed to a slowing of OSHA's regulatory
activities.81 Some recent anecdotal evidence is consistent with this
relative decline. In 1982, an industry consultant discussed " 'the
growing perception in the business community' that safety and
health is a corporate activity in which cuts can be made with risk,"
and four firms dismissed senior health officials.82
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration could suc-
cessfully encourage the development of strong health and safety
programs if it gave firms meaningful incentives to establish them.
OSHA acknowledged as much by making exemptions from routine
77. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
79. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 54,546 (1983); see supra note 8.
80. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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inspections contingent on program establishment. The problem is
that OSHA has devalued the inspection exemption by curtailing the
force of the inspection and standards setting program. A successful
effort to decentralize health and safety regulation will recognize the
benefits of private health and safety programs, but also recognize
that firms change when it is in their interest to do so. The effort
will be informed by both principles, rather than uncritical endorse-
ment of one to the exclusion of the other.
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